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We systematically study and compare damage spreading at the sparse percolation (SP) limit for
random boolean and threshold networks with perturbations that are independent of the network size
N . This limit is relevant to information and damage propagation in many technological and natural
networks. Using finite size scaling, we identify a new characteristic connectivity Ks, at which the
average number of damaged nodes d¯, after a large number of dynamical updates, is independent
of N . Based on marginal damage spreading, we determine the critical connectivity Ksparsec (N)
for finite N at the SP limit and show that it systematically deviates from Kc, established by the
annealed approximation, even for large system sizes. Our findings can potentially explain the results
recently obtained for gene regulatory networks and have important implications for the evolution of
dynamical networks that solve specific computational or functional tasks.
PACS numbers: 05.45.-a, 05.65.+b, 89.75.-k
Random boolean networks (RBN) were originally in-
troduced as simplified models of gene regulation [1, 2],
focusing on a system-wide perspective rather than on
the often unknown details of regulatory interactions [3].
In the thermodynamic limit, these disordered dynamical
systems exhibit a dynamical order-disorder transition at
a sparse critical connectivity Kc [4]; similar observations
were made for sparsely connected random threshold (neu-
ral) networks (RTN) [5, 6, 7]. For a finite system size N ,
the dynamics of both systems converge to periodic at-
tractors after a finite number of updates. At Kc, the
phase space structure in terms of attractor periods [8],
the number of different attractors [9] and the distribu-
tion of basins of attraction [10] is complex, showing many
properties reminiscent of biological networks [2].
Often, one is interested in the response of dynamical
networks to external perturbations; because these sig-
nals can disrupt the generic dynamical state (fixed point
or periodic attractor) of the network, they are usually
referred to as “damage.” This type of study has numer-
ous applications, e.g., the spreading of disease through a
population [11, 12], the spreading of a computer virus on
the internet [13], failure propagation in power grids [14],
or the perturbation of gene expression patterns in a cell
due to mutations [15]. Mean-field approaches, e.g., the
annealed approximation (AA) introduced by Derrida and
Pomeau [4], allow for an analytical treatment of damage
spreading and exact determination of the critical connec-
tivity Kc under various constraints [16, 17]. It has been
shown that local, mean-field-like rewiring rules coupled
to order parameters of the dynamics can drive both RBN
and RTN to self-organized criticality [18, 19, 20].
Mean-field approximations of RBN/RTN dynamics
rely on the assumption that N → ∞ and study the
rescaled damage d(t)/N (where d(t) is the number of
damaged nodes at time t). For an application to real-
world problems, these limits are often not very relevant.
Going beyond the framework of AA, a number of re-
cent studies focus on the finite-size scaling of (un-)frozen
and/or relevant nodes in RBN with respect to N [21, 22];
only few studies, however, consider finite-size scaling of
damage spreading in RBN [15, 23]. Here, of particular
interest is the “sparse percolation (SP) limit” [23], where
the initial perturbation size d(0) does not scale up with
network size N , i.e., the relative size of perturbations
tends to zero for large N . This limit applies to many
of the above-mentioned real-world networks (e.g., the
spread of a new computer virus on the internet launched
from a single computer). In this letter, we systemati-
cally study finite-size scaling of damage spreading in the
SP limit for both RBN and RTN. We identify a new
characteristic point Ks, where the expectation value of
the number of damaged nodes after large number of dy-
namical updates is independent of N . By the definition
of marginal damage spreading, we introduce a new ap-
proach to estimate the critical connectivity Kc(N) for
finite N , and present evidence that, even in the large
N limit, the critical connectivity for SP systematically
deviates from the predictions of mean-field theory.
First, let us define the dynamics of RBN and RTN.
A RBN is a discrete dynamical system composed of N
automata. Each automaton is a Boolean variable with
two possible states: {0, 1}, and the dynamics is such that
F : {0, 1}N 7→ {0, 1}N , (1)
where F = (f1, ..., fi, ..., fN), and each fi is represented
by a look-up table of Ki inputs randomly chosen from
the set of N automata. Initially, Ki neighbors and a
look-table are assigned to each automaton at random.
An automaton state σti ∈ {0, 1} is updated using its
2corresponding Boolean function:
σt+1i = fi(x
t
i1 , x
t
i2 , ..., x
t
iKi
). (2)
We randomly initialize the states of the automata (initial
condition of the RBN). The automata are updated syn-
chronously using their corresponding Boolean functions.
The second type of discrete dynamical system we study
is RTN. An RTN consists of N randomly interconnected
binary sites (spins) with states σi = ±1. For each site i,
its state at time t+1 is a function of the inputs it receives
from other spins at time t:
σi(t+ 1) = sgn (fi(t)) (3)
with
fi(t) =
N∑
j=1
cijσj(t) + h. (4)
The N network sites are updated synchronously. In the
following discussion the threshold parameter h is set to
zero. The interaction weights cij take discrete values
cij = +1 or −1 with equal probability. If i does not
receive signals from j, one has cij = 0.
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FIG. 1: Average Hamming distance (damage) d¯ after 200 sys-
tem updates, averaged over 10000 randomly generated net-
works for each value of K¯, with 100 different random initial
conditions and one-bit perturbed neighbor configurations for
each network. For both RBN and RTN, all curves for different
N approximately intersect in a characteristic point Ks.
Results. We first study the expectation value d¯ of dam-
age, quantified by the Hamming distance of two different
system configurations, after a large number T of system
updates. Let N be a randomly sampled set (ensemble)
of zN networks with average degree K¯, In a set of zI ran-
dom initial conditions tested on network n, and I ′n a set
of zI random initial conditions differing in one randomly
chosen bit from these initial conditions. Then we have
d¯ =
1
zN zI
zN∑
n=1
Nn∈N
zI∑
i=1
~σi∈In,~σ′i∈I
′
n
dni (T ), (5)
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FIG. 2: Upper panels: d¯ as a function of N for different K¯:
K¯ = 1.0 (+), K¯ = 1.5 (x), K¯ = 1.8 (RBN, *) and K¯ = 1.7
(RTN, *), K¯ = 2.1 (, RBN) and K¯ = 1.9 (, RTN), K¯ = 2.4
(△, RTN) and K¯ = 2.6 (⋄). The lines are fits of Eq. 6 to the
data. Lower panel: Scaling exponents γ(K¯) as a function of
K¯, as obtained from fits of Eq. 6 for RBN (+) and RTN (x).
The dashed/dotted lines mark the asymptotes as discussed in
the text.
where dni (T ) is the measured Hamming distance after T
system updates. Fig. 1 shows d¯ as a function of the
average connectivity K¯ for different network sizes N by
using a random ensemble for statistics. For both RBN
and RTN, the observed functional behavior strongly sug-
gests that the curves approximately intersect at a com-
mon point (Ks, ds), where the observed Hamming dis-
tance for large t is independent of the system size N .
To verify this finding, let us now study the finite size
scaling behavior of d¯ in this (SP) limit. For K¯ → 0 and
for large K¯, it is straightforward to estimate the asymp-
totic scaling. In the case K¯ → 0, non-zero damage can
only emerge if the initial perturbation hits a short loop
of oscillating nodes (most likely a self-connection or a
loop of length two, longer loops can be neglected). The a
priori probability to generate these loops is ∼ 1/N2, and
their number is proportional to the total number of links,
K¯N . Hence, we expect d¯ ∼ K¯N/N2 ∝ 1/N . For large
K¯, damage percolates through the system, consequently,
avalanche sizes are bounded only by the size of the sys-
tem, and we expect d¯ ∼ N . At criticality, the frozen
core of the network always remains undamaged; for this
reason, d¯ should be limited by the number of unfrozen
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FIG. 3: Upper panels: d¯(K¯) in semi-log scale, as obtained
from high-precision simulations nearKc (ensemble size: 50000
random networks with 100 random initial conditions for each
data-point, transient time: 5000 updates). Lines are fits of
Eq. 8. Lower panels: Scaling exponents γ derived from equat-
ing Eq. 6 and 8, with corresponding errorbars. The intersec-
tion with γ = 0 (dashed line) defines Ks.
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FIG. 4: The critical connectivity Ksparsec (N) in the SP limit
as a function of N , calculated from Eq. 12. Curves are
power-law fits according to Eq. 13, straight dashed lines mark
Kannealedc and Ks for RBN and RTN, respectively.
nodes nu. Recent studies predict nu ∼ N2/3 at Kc for
Boolean networks [21], hence, we expect d¯ ≤ N2/3 at Kc.
For arbitrary K¯, we make the scaling ansatz
d¯(K¯,N) = a(K¯) ·Nγ(K¯) + d0(K¯), −1 ≤ γ <∼ 1. (6)
The two upper panels of Fig. 2 illustrate that for both
RBN and RTN, the numerically measured finite size scal-
ing for 0 < K¯ ≤ 3 obeys this scaling ansatz very well. In
both cases, at some Ks slightly below Kc, we find a tran-
sition of γ from negative to positive values (Fig. 2, lower
panel). The exact determination of the point (Ks, ds)
where γ ≈ 0 is difficult; because of the slow emergence
of large damage events near Kc, measurements with fi-
nite T can substantially underestimate d¯ (in particular
for N ≥ 512). We performed high precision numeri-
cal experiments in the interval 1.6 ≤ K¯ ≤ 2.1, waiting
for T = 5000 update time steps to let the network dy-
namics relax after the initial one-bit perturbation; these
simulations conclusively show an exponential dependence
d¯ ∝ exp(c(N) · K¯) in this interval, with a constant c(N)
depending only on N (Fig. 3, upper panels). This expo-
nential dependence becomes apparent with the following
assumptions: an increase ∆d¯ of the average damage is
proportional to d¯ itself (damage can generate new dam-
age), to an increase ∆K¯ of the average connectivity, and
to some function of the system size N . Actually, it can-
not be directly proportional to N , because nodes that
are part of the frozen core always remain undamaged
asymptotically; hence, a rough upper limit is given by
the number of nonfrozen nodes, which at Kc scales as
N2/3. A lower bound can be derived by the number of
relevant nodes, that almost certainly propagate damage,
i.e. N1/3 [21]. To summarize, we approximate
∆d¯ ≈ c(N)Nα d¯ ∆K¯, (7)
with 1/3 <∼ α
<
∼ 2/3; replacing ∆d¯ and ∆K¯ with differ-
entials and integrating yields
d¯(K¯,N) ≈ c1(N) exp [c2(N)N
α K¯]. (8)
In simulations, we find α ≈ 0.42, which is well within the
range we expect from our theoretical considerations as
discussed above.
We now apply this dependence to obtain high-accuracy
fits of Eq. 6 in the interval 1.6 ≤ K¯ ≤ 2.1 (Fig. 3, lower
panels); these fits yield
(KRBNs , d
RBN
s ) = (1.87± 0.04, 0.65± 0.05) (9)
for RBN and, correspondingly,
(KRTNs , d
RTN
s ) = (1.725± 0.035, 0.52± 0.04) (10)
for RTN.
Interestingly, Ks is close to, but distinct from the crit-
ical connectivities KRBNc = 2 and K
RTN
c = 1.845, as
predicted by mean-field theory. However, a natural com-
parison has to consider possible deviations of KC at the
SP limit from these values. An intuitive definition of crit-
icality for finite N can be formulated in terms ofmarginal
damage spreading. If at time t one bit is flipped, one re-
quires at time t+ 1 [7, 17]
d¯(t+ 1) = 〈ps〉(Kc)Kc = 1, (11)
where 〈ps〉(K¯) is the average damage propagation prob-
ability. Naturally, the iteration of this map implies d¯ = 1
for all t. Note that the relation: 〈ps〉(Kc)Kc = 1 is exact
only in the framework of the AA. In the SP limit, we
4instead have to set the right hand side of Eq. 8 to unity;
inversion then leads to
Ksparsec (N) ≈ −
ln c1(N)
c2(N)Nα
. (12)
Fig. 4 shows Ksparsec (N), using the values c1(N), c2(N)
obtained from numerical fits of Eq. 8 for both RBN and
RTN. We find that both systems, in a very good approx-
imation, obey the scaling relationship
Ksparsec (N) ≈ b ·N
−δ +K∞c (13)
with b = 3.27±0.79, δ = 0.85±0.07 andK∞c = 1.90375±
0.005 for RBN and b = 3.853 ± 0.76, δ = 0.736 ± 0.05
and K∞c = 1.75598± 0.005 for RTN. Hence, in the limit
N →∞, we have
K∞,RBNc = 1.90375± 0.005 (14)
for RBN, and for RTN
K∞,RTNc = 1.75598± 0.005. (15)
Thus for both RBN and RTN, in the SP limit and for
N → ∞, the critical connectivity is considerably below
the value Kc predicted by the annealed approximation
(notice that for small N < 128, however, Ksparsec (N) >
Kannealedc ).
It is beyond the scope of this letter to discuss possible
causes for these deviations in detail (this will be accom-
plished in a long paper). In simulations, however, we
find that the statistical distributions of damage sizes in
the SP limit are highly skewed, with most configurations
leading to vanishing damage, and a fat tail of large dam-
age events. These skewed distributions imply that with
finite sampling, we always underestimate d¯, and hence
the true Ksparsec (N) and Ks will deviate even stronger
from the AA. Also, local fluctuations in damage propa-
gation cannot be neglected in this limit, as it is assumed
in mean-field approaches.
Discussion. We investigated finite size scaling of dam-
age spreading in both RBN and RTN near the sparse
percolation (SP) transition. We find that the average
damage d¯, quantified in terms of the Hamming distance
of initially nearby system states, scales ∝ Nγ(K¯) over
the whole range of sparse connectivities 0 < K¯ ≤ 3
studied in this letter. The scaling exponents γ show a
cross-over from negative to positive values at character-
istic points KRBNs and K
RTN
s below the critical points
KRBNc and K
RTN
c . We estimated the critical connectiv-
ities Ksparsec (N) based on marginal damage spreading,
and found deviations from the annealed approximation
even in the limit of large N . Interestingly, recent stud-
ies suggest that gene regulatory networks appear to be
in the ordered regime and reside slightly below the phase
transition between order and chaos [15], while theory had
proposed the critical line to be an evolutionary attractor
[1, 2]. Our study may contribute a possible explanation
to these observations: in finite networks, scaling of dam-
age with increasing N (e.g., as a consequence of gene
duplications) can be expected to be under strict selec-
tive control. Hence, the need for robust systems might
drive evolution to Ks rather than to Kc. At the same
time, however, Ks is close enough to criticality to enable
rich dynamical behavior, as required by biological cells.
Certainly this question of where in the dynamical phase
space biological networks reside cannot be answered con-
clusively, given the current state of systems biology. Ex-
perimental studies of regulatory networks and further
studies of in-silico evolutionary processes that adapt dy-
namical networks, e.g., RBNs or RTNs, to robustly solve
specific computational and functional tasks are required.
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